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CRIP UTOPIA AND THE FUTURE OF DISABILITY 
 
L‟UTOPIE DES HANDICAPÉS ET L‟AVENIR DU HANDICAP 
 




Thomas More‟s seminal work Utopia, written in 1516, has inspired works such as 
Robert Owen‟s A New View of Society (1970) and H.G. Wells‟ A Modern Utopia 
(2005), which theorize their own vision of a perfect society based on socialist 
ideals of co-operation, interdependence, unity, and harmony. Drawing on cultural 
Marxist Frederic Jameson‟s (2001a; 2001b) critique of the Utopian genre, the 
author analyzes the two Utopias of Disability Studies scholars Vic Finkelstein 
(1975; 1980) and Adolf Ratzka (1998), as well as the Anti-Utopian responses of 
critics Paul Abberley (1996; 1997, 2002) and Tom Shakespeare (2002; 2006). 
While Utopians Finkelstein and Ratzka work toward dispelling what Jameson 
refers to as the “collective fantasy” of nondisabled people—that disability is 
preventable and antithetical to “the good life”—anti-Utopians Abberley and 
Shakespeare concentrate on the difficulties of the fluidity of the 
disability/impairment distinction central to Finkelstein‟s emphasis on employment. 
 




L‟ouvrage fondateur de 1516 de Thomas More, L’Utopie, a inspiré les œuvres  
Propositions fondamentales du système social de Robert Owen et Une utopie 
moderne de  H.G. Wells. Ces dernières ont théorisé une vision de la société 
parfaite fondée sur les idéaux socialistes de coopération, d‟interdépendance, 
d‟unité et d‟harmonie. À partir de la critique littéraire marxiste de l‟utopie de 
Frederic Jameson, j‟analyserai les discours utopistes des chercheurs Vic 
Finkelstein et Adolf Ratzka, ainsi que les perspectives critiques anti-utopistes de 
Paul Abberley et de Tom Shakespeare. Ces auteurs oeuvrant dans la discipline 
des Études sur l‟incapacité. Alors que Finkelstein et Ratzka tendent à éclipser la 
notion de Jameson de “fantasie collective” partagée par les personnes n‟ayant 
pas d‟incapacités, lesquelles croient souvent que le handicap est une réalité qui 
peut disparaître et qui n‟égale pas avec la poursuite d‟une “bonne vie”, les anti-
utopiens Abberley et Shakespeare concentrent leurs efforts sur les difficultés 
concernant la distinction entre les concepts d‟incapacité et de situations de 
handicap, élément central de la perspective de Finkelstein sur l‟emploi 




Mots-clés: handicap, incapacité, fantaisie collective, utopie, modèle social, 
identité de groupe   
 
Introduction 
Disability Studies is founded on identifying and dispelling social exclusion 
and social oppression through ideals of harmony, unity, and interdependency 
among disabled people as a group; these same ideals permeate much of modern 
socialist Utopian thought. They spring from a galvanizing hope for a better 
society, a better future, and better lives for disabled people. It should thus be little 
surprise that two disability scholars have ventured to envision a society where 
these ideals have become manifest. Vic Finkelstein (1975) and Adolf Ratzka 
(1998) wrote two very different Utopian narratives 20 years apart that pose the 
same question: what are the problems that disabled people face and what might 
a society look like where these problems were solved? 
Central to both of these Utopian endeavours is a critique of the unjustified 
resistance inculcated in contemporary culture by the free-market system to 
provide disabled people with social supports and dignified work. However, the 
way disabled people directly influence the shaping of a more inclusive 
socioeconomic system in these Utopias varies radically, reflecting the different 
historical contexts particular to each author‟s composition. Written in an era prior 
to the descent of socialist thought, Finkelstein‟s focus on the power derived from 
physically disabled people who draw together as a coherent group is reminiscent 
of a socialist commune, where capitalist imperatives are discarded, and everyone 
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works not for profit but to help themselves and their community. Ratzka‟s future 
society, however, reflects the contemporary, postmodern context, demonstrating 
how neo-capitalistic economic structures can be radically altered to suit the 
needs of a more disparate group of disabled people of various minorities and 
cultural allegiances. Before we move on to an analysis of these two narratives, 
we must first situate them within the Utopian genre itself and determine what 
exactly we mean by Utopia. 
Thomas More‟s original 1516 work Utopia was a critique of both society‟s 
structure and values and the vanity of trying to plan or institute any “perfect” 
society (More, 2001). While the term Utopia is at present generally understood to 
mean “perfect society”, it literally means “no place”, combining the Greek words 
ou, meaning no, and topos, meaning place. While it is unclear whether More 
believed in the efficiency of his Utopia, the works of later writers who imagined 
less ambiguously positive societies have become termed as Eutopias, meaning 
good place, derived from the word eu, meaning good. This term shares an 
interesting relationship with the related Greek derivative eugenics, which itself is 
derived from the word eu, meaning good and the suffix genes, meaning born, a 
term coined by Charles Darwin‟s cousin, Francis Gaulton. Inherent in the idea of 
eugenics is the possibility of “improving” society by increasing the quality of the 
genes of those who comprise it by either preventing those with undesirable traits 
to pass genes on (positive eugenics) or encouraging those with desirable traits to 
procreate (negative eugenics) (Carlson, 2001, p. 11).  The upshot here is that, 
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just as More realized that there could be no perfect society, there will likely never 
be a perfect genome or contingent physical and mental constitution, because 
ideals of what is good or perfect change constantly with the interplay of a 
society‟s culture, technological development, and socioeconomic structure. 
Neither Finkelstein nor Ratzka claim to have a cohesive understanding of 
human nature or society that would allow them to construct a perfectly functional 
human society, but instead engage in what Gregory Claeys (1999) terms a 
Utopian satire, in which an author intends “a contemporaneous reader to view as 
a criticism of the existing society” (p. 2). Their works are also certainly Eutopias in 
that the disabled people and their communities are empowered, vital, and 
contributing citizens. To determine the place of these Utopias within Disability 
Studies, I turn to Frederic Jameson‟s notion of the Utopian impulse. 
 
Frederic Jameson and the Utopian Impulse 
I refer to Frederic Jameson‟s analyses of the Utopian genre to identify and 
explain three manifestations of what Jameson calls the “Utopian impulse” (2005, 
p. 230)  evident within Disability Studies. Firstly, from its inception Disability 
Studies has been engaged in an anti-Utopian critique of the collective fantasy 
permeating mass culture—that impairment is tragedy and that through hard work 
a healthy normal body can be achieved and maintained. Secondly, disability 
scholars Finkelstein and Ratzka have engaged in actual Utopian projects that 
imagine ideal, inclusive communities that dispel the able-bodied collective 
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fantasy. Finally, Tom Shakespeare (2006) and Paul Abberley (1996) provide anti-
Utopian analyses of Finkelstein that criticize his emphasis on work and 
disablement. 
Jameson distinguishes between the Utopian principle, the will to 
systematically change the socioeconomic and geographical structure of a society 
to make it function better, and the Utopian impulse, which refers to a more latent 
hope for a better life and society that can be found dispersed throughout culture. 
The idea of a Utopian impulse embedded in culture arises with the realization 
that it had become very unlikely that historical events would conspire to manifest 
any Utopian principle through Marx‟s prediction of a proletarian revolution. 
Therefore, Jameson, a disciple of the Frankfurt school, defers to its cofounder 
Ernst Bloch by tracing the dispersion of the Utopian principle throughout 
consumer culture, reformed as tendrils of the Utopian impulse to be seen “at 
work everywhere, in all the objects of culture as in all social activities and 
individual values or more properly psychological phenomena” (Jameson, 2001a, 
p. 364). The Utopian impulse is often manifested in different forms whereby 
“cultural objects become no longer mere diversions or distractions but the 
unconscious or semi-conscious exercise of collective fantasy” (Jameson, 2001a, 
p. 366).  
The exercise of collective fantasy can be glimpsed in so simple a scenario 
as browsing 10-foot long store shelves with 30 distinct kinds of well-marketed 
toothpaste, each brand promising to make your life that much better than the 
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other. More powerfully, it is the fantasy that we are supposed to have the 
physical wherewithal to maintain our bodies, stay free from impairment, and 
embody youth and beauty. The burden of choice creates the further burden of 
responsibility, for if products exist that can ostensibly optimize appearance and 
health, then those who fall short sadly feel at fault. 
As it is a collective fantasy, no one escapes from its effects entirely, so it 
not only predisposes nondisabled people to devalue the lives of disabled people, 
but it corrodes the self-worth of disabled people themselves. Furthermore, many 
deviations from the bodily ideal, such as obesity or even aging, are met with 
approbation and a measure of blame, which is even more misguided at a time 
when obesity and geriatric populations are increasing dramatically. 
Disability Studies has long been critical of this Utopian impulse, most 
notably in the writing of Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (1996) and Tom 
Shakespeare (2002), who each embark on an anti-Utopian project to decipher 
and defuse the affects of Utopia on disabled people. Garland-Thomson (1996) 
describes this process of disablement as part of a hegemony that is meant to 
preserve privileged categories such as healthy, beautiful, normal, intelligent, and 
so forth. Those unfamiliar with disabled people and the experience of 
disablement may comfortably fit into privileged roles without questioning the 
system, while those who do not fit in so easily are left in a marginal position that 
they must accept or resist.   
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Tom Shakespeare attributes part of the psychological origins of hostility 
toward disabled people to the tendency of nondisabled people to “deny their 
vulnerability and frailty and mortality, and to project these uncomfortable issues 
onto disabled people, who they can subsequently oppress and exclude and 
ignore” (2002, p. 29). Two causes of impaired psychosocial interaction between 
disabled and nondisabled people identified by Harlan Hahn (1988), an American 
sociologist, likely stem directly from this collective fantasy. The first is existential 
anxiety, or the projected threat of the loss of physical capabilities; the second is 
aesthetic anxiety, or the fear of others whose traits are perceived as disturbing or 
unpleasant. These psychological states of denial and anxiety may originate from 
a cultural devaluation of impairment, but this devaluation is itself enmeshed with 
social structures that exclude impaired people from public and economic venues, 
which in turn prevent individual validation through social activity and paid work.  
Until the mid-1990s, the increasing dispersal of the collective fantasy‟s 
effects and an end to disablement seemed within reach, according to the 
promulgations of British disability scholars such as Mike Oliver and Colin Barnes 
(1998), and Finkelstein. Not only did these Marxist social modelists apply their 
brand of historical materialism to conceptualize disability in the past (Gleeson, 
1997), but they had also used this method to predict the future of disability. They 
foresaw an end to disability in a Utopian future where the social model would be 
applied effectively so as to do away with the social discrimination that is rooted in 
material barriers. This Utopian dream was fueled both by the increasing 
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efficiency with which the disability movement effects progressive changes in 
policy and the community, as well as the burgeoning complexity and strength of 
Disability Studies in the academic arena.  
Oliver, Barnes, and Finkelstein continue to promote what Shakespeare 
(2002) refers to as a “strong” social model, which makes a much more rigid 
binary distinction between disability and impairment, posing an ethereal “society” 
as the sole cause of disablement. Despite Shakespeare‟s continuing extensive 
criticism of this model in his book Disability Rights and Wrongs (2006), his strong 
distinction between disability and impairment provided fertile grounds for 
imagining an endpoint of disability politics. Thanks to this distinction, since the 
movement‟s inception, there has been an ideologically intoxicating Utopian 
dream that involves minority revolution and an end to disablement.  
The following Utopia written by Finkelstein presents a community in which 
inclusion in the workplace and public areas does away with the stigmatization 
and consequent internalized oppression of people with physical impairments. 
Finkelstein argues that disablement can thus be abolished, but he could not 
overcome those flaws found in past Utopian projects: incomplete knowledge of 
socioeconomics and community. However, like More, this was almost certainly 




Crip Utopia and Socialist Triumph 
Finkelstein‟s 1975 essay “To Deny or Not to Deny Disability” is a Utopian 
critique of how Western societies have disabled people with physical impairments 
by failing to accommodate the synthetic physical environment to their needs. He 
envisions a Utopian community composed entirely of 1,000 or so wheelchair 
users who drew together because of a shared sense of exasperation with a 
society that has adapted far too little to suit their needs. Able-bodied people 
became a part of this community “through no fault of their own” (Finkelstein, 
1975), and since it was so difficult to accommodate them in an environment set 
up specifically for wheelchair users, they had to twist and stress their bodies in 
order to navigate their new environment; as a result, they developed various 
impairments. Since they could not physically adapt to the town, this group 
became the “able-bodied disabled”, marked by bruises on their heads and 
increasing decrepitude. It became so bad that 
special aids were designed by the wheelchair-user doctors and associated 
professions for the able-bodied disabled members of the village. All the 
able-bodied were given special toughened helmets (provided free by the 
village) to wear at all times. Special braces were designed which gave 
support while keeping the able-bodied wearer bent at a height similar to 
their fellow wheelchair-user villagers (Finkelstein, 1975). 
 
This short allegory touches upon most of the political issues common to 
the social paradigm: stigma based on physical difference, inequality, physical 
accessibility, unemployment, and a lack of understanding between privileged and 
subjugated groups. Wheelchair users ran their entire community and every 
institution within it, including the mass media, and able-bodied people “are only 
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rarely seen” and thus “little understood” (Finkelstein, 1975). The wheelchair users 
were also in control of the means of production through the use of adaptive aids, 
ironically promoting the value of complete independence. 
Because everyone in this community looked the same in terms of physical 
impairment, and was able to contribute to supporting themselves and their 
community by working, Finkelstein does away with aesthetic and existential 
stigmatization by resolving economic and resource difficulties that devalue those 
who cannot produce as much or at all. This vision was a response to the 
resistance that British advocacy groups encountered when trying to establish 
positions for disabled people on committees that allocated resources and 
developed community programs for disabled people (Oliver, 1990). This 
philosophy of self-direction is epitomized by the slogan “nothing about us without 
us”, as advocates for self-advocacy and self-management within the disability 
rights movement had “begun to organize for their emancipation and joined the 
growing numbers of groups struggling against the social discrimination” 
(Finkelstein, 1975). 
In conclusion, Finkelstein describes an emergent group of “able-bodied 
disabled”, those nondisabled people who injured themselves navigating the 
unaccommodating environment. This group came together in order to promote 
their own minority interests within the little society, and even felt that they could 
contribute vital cultural and political knowledge due to their specific experience 
that wheelchair users would not have. This account illustrates how reasonable, 
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even inevitable, it is that any minority group in such circumstances should not, 
and would not, stand for such subjugation. The moral of the story is that when 
living in a community specifically structured to facilitate one mode of mobility, the 
well-adapted majority becomes complacent and resistant to alter an environment 
for the needs of an already stigmatized minority.  
Criticisms leveled at this Utopian allegory concentrate on the obvious: 
wheelchair users have different physical impairments and conditions; they need 
home care and other social supports from others, at least to some extent, 
regardless of adaptive aids; it is unlikely that disabled people identify so strongly 
with each other that they would reject able-bodied family and friends; most 
importantly, barriers to socialization and employment are not the main concerns 
of many wheelchair users and disabled people in general. Although this fiction or 
“fable” (Shakespeare, 2006, p. 44) may seem naïve as a functional Utopian 
community, like Thomas More‟s original 1516 work Utopia, it is meant to be a 
critique of both a society‟s structure and values, and the vanity of trying to plan or 
institute any perfect society (More, 2001). 
The deeper problem with this allegory is Finkelstein‟s implication that there 
is some sort of end situation, a final goal at which point an equitable society will 
be established and disabled people will achieve their ultimate emancipation. This 
view is supported by his 1980 essay in which he adapts Marx‟s conception of 
societal transformation in a three-stage progression, the final stage of which 
“marks the beginning of a struggle to reintegrate people with physical 
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impairments” and “heralds the elimination of disability” (Finkelstein, 1980, p. 8). 
Fellow strong social modelists Mike Oliver and Colin Barnes (1998) echo this 
sentiment:  
Disabled people have no choice but to attempt to build a better world 
because it is impossible to have a vision of inclusionary capitalism: we all 
need a world where impairment is valued and celebrated and all disabling 
barriers are eradicated. Such a world would be inclusionary for all (p. 62).  
 
Claire Tregaskis (2002) attributes this tendency of Finkelstein, Oliver, and Barnes 
to their advocacy of a materialist model, for although they mention the 
importance of attitudes, “there is an assumption that change in the position of 
disabled people will only come about with the removal of capitalism, the system 
which is seen as having created disability” (1998, p. 263). 
Despite the grand vision of these strong social modelists, it will take far 
more than restructuring urban areas and the workplace to negate the biological 
realities underpinning notions of impairment and related social causes of 
disablement. While it is still important to work toward removing environmental 
barriers, this will not be enough to negate the social mechanisms of disablement, 
which are based in large part on existential and aesthetic anxieties evoked by 
bodily difference and anomalous appearance. Environmental restructuring and 
change can only go so far, so other avenues of resistance that can be wielded by 
any disabled person must be further developed and recognized. 
One form of resistance to which Jameson turns in order to undermine the 
dominant ideology in an era of diminishing distinctions between groups of 
competing interests is simple self-reflection:  
13 
 
It is thus no longer merely a question of repudiating the values and 
philosophies of my class enemies, but rather of some much more 
complicated process of self-analysis whereby I come to detect and 
eradicate the ideological infection inevitably present in myself as well 
(Jameson, 2001a, p. 366).  
 
However, encouraging disabled people to critically appraise and challenge 
disabling forces is already a central project of Disability Studies, so for an 
oppressed underclass disproportionately prone to poverty and unemployment, 
any solutions will be part of an ongoing, fluctuating, and often ambiguous 
process, as we shall see in the next section. 
 
Utopian Dialectic and Anti-Utopian Reactions: The Disability/Impairment 
Distinction 
In “Utopianism and Anti-Utopianism”, Jameson (2001b) outlines various 
antinomies, or opposing ideas, between Utopian and anti-Utopian projects that 
aim to dispel the collective fantasy. The most important function of these 
antinomies is the formation of a dialectical process whereby the anti-Utopian 
projects sow the seeds of the next Utopian project (Jameson, 2001b), such as 
those of Abberley (2002) and Shakespeare (2006) to follow. In other words, 
Finkelstein‟s Utopia is an anti-Utopian reaction to a wider, less coherent, Utopian 
collective fantasy, and the anti-anti-Utopian responses of Abberley and 
Shakespeare build upon and refine Finkelstein‟s ideas. As we see below, an 
exploration of the disability/impairment distinction reveals the complexities 
inherent in conceptualizing the future of disability. 
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Paul Abberley is one of the few strong social modelists to have actively 
struggled to incorporate impairment into an understanding of disability while 
accounting for how changing meanings of impairment must consequently change 
contingent notions of disability. Abberley approaches impairment as an unstable 
category, complicating Finkelstein‟s theories of individual and group identity, as 
well as oppression and Utopia. In an anti-Utopian reaction to Finkelstein, 
Abberley means to overlook the more obvious flaws; he instead explores the 
implications arising from Finkelstein‟s implicit assumption that paid work and an 
accessible workplace could both negate any negative effects of impairment and 
put an end to disability. He explains that Finkelstein reinforces the trope of 
modern social theory that identifies an impaired individual‟s inability to meet 
certain demands of work performance (with or without environmental 
adaptations) and productivity as a primary source of disablement. Despite shifting 
the focus from biological to social causes of exclusion, Finkelstein still 
emphasizes the necessity of enabling the impaired individual to work. Abberley 
finds this troublesome, as it does not account for certain impairments, such as 
extreme fatigue or mental incapacity, which could never be completely offset by 
adaptive aids or reorganized workplaces. 
In “Work, Disability, Disabled People and European Social Theory”, 
Abberley (2002) refutes the usefulness of classical social theory (pretty much as 
a whole), as well as social psychology and symbolic interactionist theories, as 
effective methods to account for how changing conceptions of impairment relate 
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to ideas of oppression. While his dismissal of 200 years of social theory is likely 
premature, the need for alternatives to paid work for individual self-esteem and 
validation in the eyes of others are undoubtedly warranted. In refutation of 
Finkelstein‟s materialist Marxist analysis, Abberley urges that if we must search 
“elsewhere than to a paradise of labour for the concrete Utopia that informs the 
development of theories of our oppression, it is not on the basis of classical 
analyses of social labour that our thinking will be further developed” (2002, p. 
135). Even in a world where all impaired people could be employed and 
participating in the creation of social wealth, the means of production may very 
well change more quickly than extensive adaptive infrastructure, leaving many 
disabled people unable (or unwilling—being enabled to do miserable work is not 
very helpful) to adapt accordingly. Many impairments severely limit the ability of 
an individual to ever work, so there will always be some individuals who cannot 
contribute to society, or at least not in this particular way. We must never forget 
that we cannot derive a person‟s value from their contribution to the GDP. 
He is actually clearer about the nature of his misgivings in his earlier essay 
“Work, Utopia and Impairment”, arguing that the way in which a particular 
sociological analysis is critical of “the real world is predicated upon the notion of 
how things could be, a Utopia. Classical social theories give participation in 
production a crucial importance for social integration; in their Utopias work is a 
need, a source of identity” (Abberley, 1996, p. 64). The logic of productivity 
involves a value judgment of the worth of impaired modes of being, such that 
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policy and means of distribution ensure an individual who cannot work due to 
impairment receives only enough to subsist. A society that overvalues the ability 
to work will find it difficult to move beyond the incentive principle, and a system 
structured to prevent indolence is simply no longer tenable. 
Tom Shakespeare reflects on the difficulties pointed out by such social 
modelists as Abberley and rejects most of the social model‟s basic tenets. 
Shakespeare outlines three ways in which impairment is an essential cause of 
disability as well as a socially constructed category. Firstly, it is necessary to 
have an impairment in order to experience disabling barriers, such that “there can 
be no impairment without society, nor disability without impairment” 
(Shakespeare, 2006, p. 34). According to Shakespeare:  Impairment may not 
be a sufficient cause of the difficulties which disabled people  
face, but they are a necessary one. If there is no link between impairment 
and disability, then disability becomes a much broader, vaguer term which 
describes any form of socially imposed restriction (2006, p. 34).  
 
B. Hughes (2002) elaborates on this point: “posing impairment as fundamentally 
biologically constituted, devoid of social meaning and separate from the self, 
impairment can only be biological dysfunction and thus identified solely by the 
authority of the medical gaze” (p. 67). 
Abberley points out two ways in which impairment may fluctuate according 
to availability of medical resources such as treatment, adaptive aids, and 
prostheses. In this way, oppression results not only from disability, but 
impairment as well. The first way that a cultural understanding of impairment may 
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vary occurs if a cure is found. Once a given impairment “may be prevented, 
eradicated or its effects significantly ameliorated it can no longer be regarded as 
a simple natural phenomenon even if it were at one time correct to do so” 
(Abberley, 1996, p. 64). Although Abberley is in danger here of attempting to 
choose both an essential and relative sense of impairment, the latter stance is 
helpful; once a common impairment becomes easily treated, it loses its sense of 
naturalness or inevitability, and takes on a social meaning insofar as “the 
withholding of treatment when it is possible and desired must be seen as a form 
of oppression” (Abberley, 1996, p. 64). However, Abberley does not explore at 
what point a treatment becomes “possible and desired” in terms of resource 
distribution, need, and cost.  
Shakespeare‟s (2006) second reason as to how the meaning of 
impairment changes is through social arrangements such as war, poverty, and 
malnutrition; more importantly, impairment is often exacerbated by social 
arrangements. The construction of impairment changes according to how well 
developed technology is, the cost of delivering this technology, and the 
distributive infrastructure put in place to assess individuals in order to establish 
priority. It is likely that the availability and low cost of the technology itself not only 
changes the construct of the impairment but also heightens our perception of its 
negative attributes. Deborah Marks (1999) provides an intriguing example in 
which disability groups lobbied in New York State to have voice augmentation 
devices categorized as prosthetics rather than needs because they give the user 
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a “voice”. Prosthetics fall under medical insurance since they are seen as 
replacement body parts, whereas adaptive aids are funded by either social 
services or an individual‟s own resources because they assist or provide a new 
ability rather than replacing what is accepted to be a biologically natural part of 
the person (Marks, 1999).  
These examples also illustrate Shakespeare‟s third point: 
what counts as impairment is a social judgment. The number of impaired 
people depends on the definition of what counts as impairment. The 
meaning of impairment is a cultural issue, related to values and attitudes 
of the wider society. The visibility and salience of impairment depends on 
the expectations and arrangements in a particular society: for example, 
dyslexia does not become a problem until society demands literacy of its 
citizens (Shakespeare, 2006, p. 35). 
 
This applies to the potential of new biotechnologies to foster eugenic attitudes, 
whereby the very availability of prenatal screening makes having disabled 
children morally questionable. This could also be extended to the debate over 
cochlear implants in the Deaf community, as a prosthesis makes being part of 
Deaf culture a choice as opposed to an inevitability. Deaf parents are condemned 
for choosing deaf embryos through in vitro fertilization, or the needs of Deaf 
individuals themselves are dismissed, as it is deemed their fault for not indulging 
in the technology. Both of these examples illustrate how advances in technology 
that change the very meaning of impairment can make the normal deviant as well 
as create factions within minority groups brought together by the similar cultural 
experience arising from their biological commonality. 
19 
 
Jonathan Cheu (2002) takes up this issue in “De-gene-erates Replicants 
and Other Aliens: (Re)Defining Disability in Futuristic Film”, arguing that the 
inception of genetic engineering as it is represented in science fiction films 
presents the possibility that as long as certain sections of society have more 
access to genetic therapies than others, our definition of impairment will change 
drastically. In this case, instead of making impairment and the contingent 
category of disability obsolete, definitions of both of these categories will simply 
shift. If disability is a construction based on relative bodily difference and ability, 
then it will likely persist if developing biomedical resources are not allocated 
fairly. 
Likely the most important of the above distinctions is Shakespeare‟s first 
point concerning impairment: Disability must have a biological basis in order to 
distinguish disablement from other forms of social restrictions that ideally can be 
solved through changing social attitudes. This fact leads to one of Abberley‟s 
most crucial points: Unlike physical differences such as race, sex, or sexual 
orientation,  
for disabled people the biological difference...is itself a part of the 
oppression. It is crucial that a theory of disability as oppression comes to 
grips with this “real” inferiority, since it forms a bedrock upon which 
justificatory oppressive theories are based and, psychologically, an 
immense impediment to the development of political consciousness 
amongst disabled people. Such a development is systematically blocked 
through the naturalization of impairment (1997, p. 165).  
 
Marks supports this distinction, claiming that “to leave out impairment 
means that it becomes difficult to distinguish disability from other forms of 
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oppression” (1999, p. 150). Mairian Corker and Carol Thomas (2002) affirm that 
impairment should be considered as a biosocial phenomenon rather than an 
unproblematized biological or naturalistic phenomenon. Instead of concentrating 
on socioeconomic factors of disablement shared by most disabled people, there 
“should be an analysis of the similarities and differences in disability experiences 
associated with the full range of impairments” (Corker & Thomas, 2002, p. 24). 
Although people with various impairments confront some forms of disability which 
are common to all disabled people, “there are also specific kinds of encounters 
with ableism more closely bound up with the features of the impairment itself” 
(Corker & Thomas, 2002, p. 19). Corker and Thomas further complicate the 
matter when they emphasize that “the study of disability should carefully consider 
the ways in which oppressive social relationships intersect and the 
consequences that this has to lived experience” (Corker & Thomas, 2002, p. 24). 
However, accommodating the diverse experiences of both impairment and 
disability makes it more difficult to envision group solidarity, let alone co-
operation among groups. While a commonality of some sort is necessary to 
maintain an active political or cultural group, the distinction between disability and 
impairment in any situated individual experience will likely never be clear or 





Reformation of the Utopian Impulse 
The Utopian meta-narrative of the strong social model has been gradually 
dissolved by its anti-Utopian critics, but does this mean that a coherent and 
effective disability movement is less possible? I think that the grander vision of an 
inclusive society will persist, but the processes involved have simply become 
more complicated. These processes are clarified by Jameson in his description of 
what he considers to be the most important Utopian antinomy: the developing 
relationship between small political groups that pose a shared anti-Utopian 
resistance toward oppressive collective fantasies. These minority groups, who 
come together in cultural solidarity, based on shared experiences of 
discrimination and stigma due to race, gender, sexual orientation, or biological 
difference, ground the anti-Utopian position.  
It has been a common phenomenon among feminist, queer, and disability 
activists to militantly blame a complementary majority group to be the active 
cause of their oppression in early periods of their intermingling theoretical 
development. However, as each particular group has matured its members have 
developed divergent notions of group-, individual-, and multiple-identities, for 
disabled people are generally of a certain gender, race, and cultural background 
as well. Despite these difficulties (or maybe because of them), Jameson argues: 
group politics only begin to evolve in a radical direction when the various 
groups all arrive at the common problem and necessity of their strategic 
interrelationships, something for which any number of historic terms are 
available from Gramsci‟s “historic block” through alliance politics to the 
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“popular front” of “„marginalities” currently proposed by “queer theory” 
(Jameson, 2001b, p. 390). 
 
This convergence of interest is becoming increasingly apparent with the 
incorporation of feminist and queer ideologies into Disability Studies, and even 
more encouragingly with the incorporation of disability theory into an increasing 
number of other disciplines. In keeping with his conception of the dialectical 
procession of Utopian/anti-Utopian thought, Jameson concludes this argument 
with the proclamation that “any active or operative political anti-Utopianism (those 
which are not mere liberalism in disguise) must sooner or later reveal itself as a 
vibrant form of Utopianism in its own right” (Jameson, 2001b, p. 392). In the 
following Utopian project, Ratzka (1998) poignantly extrapolates this developing 
trajectory among minority groups in the United Minority parties of the future. 
 
Crip Utopia and the Future of Disability 
Ratzka‟s “Crip Utopia and the End of the Welfare State” (1998), written 
more than 20 years after Finkelstein‟s original foray into the genre, offers a more 
tongue-in-cheek, satirical narrative of both the societal collective fantasy and anti-
Utopian project of Disability Studies. He also echoes similar concerns about 
work, policy, oppression, and empowerment raised by Finkelstein, Abberley, 
Shakespeare, Thomas, and Corker; however, in contrast with the positions of the 
strong social modelists, Ratzka imagines a capitalist society of economic and 
political inclusion.  
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Unlike Finkelstein‟s Utopia, Ratzka‟s work is not set in the present or 
immediate future, but somewhere around 2050, and instead of simply critiquing 
society‟s unwillingness to change for the benefit of disabled people, he 
concentrates on how alternatives to paid work could reduce the stigmatization of 
disabled people. Ratzka‟s perspective is likely informed by the international 
Independent Living movement‟s philosophy, which can be characterized as a 
political minority model that has been heavily influential in the North American 
disability movement. Ratzka addresses the concerns of Mairian Corker, 
Shakespeare, and Abberley insofar as he accounts for multiple intersecting and 
coalescing forms of oppression based on race, gender, religion, and impairment.  
The viewpoint character of Ratzka‟s narrative is his fictional friend Crip van 
Winkle, a man “of strong convictions and moral fortitude”, a wheelchair user who 
had himself cryogenically frozen because he had had enough of discrimination. 
He emerges from his cryogenic chamber in 2050 and is met by an historian who 
wants to learn about life in the last century. These two interlocutors, Crip van 
Winkle and his new historian friend, play two different narrative roles: Crip is 
naïvely amazed at the social advancements made by (and not for) disabled 
people while the historian relates the details of this future Utopia matter-of-factly, 
as though it has always been common sense to adapt environments and social 
systems in order to include all people. The historian expresses his own 
amazement about how backwards people were in Crip‟s time. Through this 
dialogue, Ratzka is both criticizing Western society‟s irrational resistance to adapt 
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to the needs of the disabled minority, while engaging in a satirical projection of 
how reconciling various conflicting disability philosophies might work. 
The historian explains to Crip that a “young and angry disabled 
generation” heralded the minority revolution in the early 21st century, initiating 
radical political change such that United Minority parties sprang up “and soon 
after dominated politics just about everywhere. They quickly moved to protect 
their constituencies‟ human and civil rights through detailed and tough laws” 
(Ratzka 1998). The United Minority party was led by the president of the United 
States of Europe: a black, Jewish, lesbian, single parent, smoker, and recent 
immigrant. Talk about your fluid identity! 
The United States of Europe officially abolished apartheid in the year 
2024, making the international sign of access forbidden because “it singles out 
and stigmatizes a particular group of citizens” such that it would have been more 
practical “to mark the places that were inaccessible in order to point to the full 
extent of the injustice” (Ratzka, 1998). Competing charities run by factious 
interest groups, “one for left-hand amputees, one for right-hand amputees, 
victims of Foot and Mouth Disease and other assorted ailments” were done away 
with and in their place a National Science Foundation was instituted to control all 
money for research, such that nobody would be reliant on “private funding for 
things like health care, food, shelter, clothing or assistive devices” (Ratzka, 
1998). Of course, one institution to handle all of the essentials of life would likely 
hold far too much power to remain benign, resulting in a dystopian scenario. 
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In this brave new world, most disabled people work. In this respect, there 
is hardly any difference between the disabled and nondisabled population 
anymore: “Perhaps a couple of percentage points, but nothing like the 50-60% 
that you had last century” (Ratzka, 1998). However, along with an emphasis on 
work, Ratzka imagines the implementation of what are presently trial methods of 
resource distribution for those who cannot support themselves, methods that 
address much of Abberley‟s concerns about stigma and devaluation caused by 
an inability to work. Everyone receives a “citizen‟s wage that allows a comparable 
lifestyle, such that most disabled people work, as many in proportion to 
nondisabled people” (Ratzka, 1998). Disabled people receive direct payments 
from the government that enable them to negotiate their own purchases of 
personal assistance services, assistive devices, and transportation, regardless of 
income. Everyone is required by law to purchase disability insurance in order to 
do away with financial difficulties following acquired disability. Not only does this 
make people aware of their tenuous (or temporary) able-bodied status, but it 
ostensibly does away with the stigma of poverty and dependence that derive 
from the necessary high taxes to fund an extensive system of social supports.  
 
Conclusion 
The Utopian projects of Ratzka and Finkelstein, and the anti-Utopian 
reactions of Abberley and Shakespeare, all struggle with issues of equality, 
individual validation, environmental barriers, resource distribution, and resistance 
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to normative values. As rates of impairment rise rapidly with an aging population, 
dispelling the ableist collective fantasy is not only vital to the well-being of 
disabled people, but people in general, for as biomedicine advances, concepts of 
impairment will shift along with what we consider to be the normal body. It is 
likely that this fluctuation of impairment due to advances in medicine will affect 
conceptions of disability as much as a strong political disability movement that 
strives to change both societal attitudes and environmental accessibility. A rapid 
increase in obese and geriatric populations contrasts sharply with the mass 
mediated presentations of the ideal body and are less tenable than ever, causing 
a mounting reliance on the health care system to manage the diverse number of 
aging related illness and disability. This population increase will both serve to 
swell the numbers of the disability movement and increase awareness of the 
social adversity involved, while at the same time push Medicine toward new 
cures and prostheses. This will likely further stigmatize those too impaired to 
work at present, while undermining any simplistic notions of disability as a 
coherent group.  
Shakespeare points out that “there are so many barriers to be removed, 
that perhaps it has not been necessary to think about what the inclusive 
environment might look like, when the Utopia is finally achieved” (2006, p. 44). 
However, I would argue that imagining a barrier-free Utopia is vital to the 
movement‟s momentum. Predictions of future states of disability according to the 
social model‟s assumptions that a barrier- free environment is possible and will 
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do away with disability may seem naïve in retrospect, but its impetus in this 
regard may also be indicative of the structural limitations of new theory to provide 
motivation for such visions of the future. While there unfortunately have not been 
any anti-Utopian reactions to Ratzka‟s brilliant narrative, it stands as an 
accessible and exemplary exploration into how our contemporary theory and 
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